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The traditional means of user authentication based on usernames and passwords is subject to a number of behavioral concerns 
that can significantly reduce the security provided.  As such, an important part of proposing a new authentication scheme 
should involve careful consideration of behavioral factors.  Little research has actually examined the role user acceptance 
plays in different authentication schemes.  Our research in progress proposes the investigation of user acceptance of a 
cognitive password system comprised of multiple authenticators.  Specifically we will investigate the role that password 
characteristics, such as number of passwords and password complexity, coupled with frequency of use, play in users’ 
perceptions and overall willingness to faithfully adopt an alternative authentication system.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The most common form of authentication in use today is the username/password combination. Over the years, good 
password practices have been established for this authentication scheme. For instance, it is recommended that strong 
passwords should be used, i.e., the password should be of a minimum length,  include lower case and upper case letters, 
numbers and non-alphanumeric characters.  Such passwords are generally difficult for others to discover by guessing.  
However, they are also difficult for the user to commit to memory and subsequently recall from long-term memory (Adams 
et al. 1997; Brown et al. 2004). This problem is exacerbated by the increasing number of passwords that users are required to 
remember. The ever increasing number of passwords, coupled with the recommendation that the same password  not be used 
for more than one system, leads to the "password overload syndrome" (Furnell 2005; Hovav and Berger 2009). Additionally, 
it is recommended that passwords be changed periodically. The collective burden, of having to remember so many 
frequently-changing strong passwords, causes most users to adopt insecure coping mechanisms.  Primarily, this takes the 
form of writing passwords down or maintaining a file on the computer with the passwords, which are subject to discovery by 
physical and electronic intruders respectively.  Alternately, users may use the same password for multiple systems despite 
rules advising against such a practice (Ives et al. 2004; Smith 1987; Zviran and Haga 1999). Further, passwords, no matter 
how strong they are, are subject to discovery by others by practices such as phishing and spoofing. In effect, existing 
username/password authentication systems have weaknesses, which could compromise the overall security of personal and 
organizational information assets.  
Variations of the username/password authentication systems have been proposed.  These include the use of longer easier-to-
remember passphrases (Porter 1982), and the use of multiple easily-remembered passwords (Zviran and Haga 1990). Zviran 
and Haga, and later Bunnell et al. (1997), have shown that the cognitive password system based on the use of multiple 
question and answer passwords reduce the load on memory, and can also yield an acceptable tradeoff between memorability 
and guessability.  Despite such encouraging results, these variations have not been used in developing primary authentication 
systems.  
Our longer-term research goal is to examine the merits of a cognitive password system as a universal alternative to the 
current strong password system. Many questions have to be answered to determine if the proposed system provides 
significant advantages over the traditional system. For instance, Zviran and Haga (1990) have studied memorability and 
guessability for a specific set of parameters. However, there is no research to indicate whether the results are robust over a 
broader range of parameters. To provide an example, they test the ability of subjects to remember the full set of passwords 
after three months. One could argue that memorability may suffer more over longer periods of time, or that memorability for 
frequently-used passwords may be higher than memorability of infrequently-used passwords.  Further, Zviran and Haga have 
not examined user response to such systems. Users may be able to remember the multiple passwords, but may be resistant to 
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entering five passwords (Zviran and Haga’s recommendation) each time to gain access to a computer system. Thus, much 
research has to be done to progress the idea beyond the preliminary work that has been done so far.  
The current article describes a proposal to test user response to a multi-password system to access an experimental site that 
provides task-relevant information. Thus, the study is expected to provide results that would be relevant to access task-
relevant sites, such as user accounts in organizations.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of the relevant literature. The following 
section articulates research questions. Then the theoretical basis of the study is discussed and hypotheses developed. A 
proposed study is described, followed by a few concluding remarks.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Weaknesses of Traditional Password Systems 
We use the term traditional password system to refer to the authentication system based on single user-generated password 
systems, which require strong passwords.  In the past decade or so, with the increasing potential for online hacking, password 
policies, which guide the creation and use of passwords, have become commonplace.  Some policies can be enforced through 
technical means.  For instance, systems can force a user to create a strong password, but such technical enforcement is not 
always implemented. Even if implemented, users may find ways to violate the spirit of the rule by choosing easily guessed 
passwords that still meet strength requirements (e.g. P@55w0rd)(Keith et al. 2009). Other policies are entirely dependent on 
user compliance. For instance, users are advised not to write their passwords down and put them in places where they may be 
easily found. Such policies cannot be technically enforced.  In summary, the traditional password system, despite its 
widespread adoption and use, has a variety of shortcomings that leave perceptions of its reliability and security unsurprisingly 
low (Furnell 2005).   
A password is compromised when it is no longer a secret only known to the user, and can occur when an attacker guesses the 
password, gains access to the password, or a combination of both.  Guessing attacks occur online, and generally consist of an 
attacker repeatedly guessing commonly used passwords (Ding and Horster 1995; Keith et al. 2009).  Attackers may also gain 
access to the password, either in its plaintext or encrypted form in a variety of ways including phishing attacks (Hovav and 
Berger 2009), man-in-the-middle attacks(Schneier 2005), Trojans/keyloggers (Schneier 2005) dictionary attacks (Keith et al. 
2009) and knowing where an user wrote his/her password down (Keith et al. 2009; Porter 1982). Research into problems with 
the traditional password systems has resulted in the development of several variations, such as associative passwords (Smith 
1987), cognitive passwords (Haga and Zviran 1989; Haga and Zviran 1991; Zviran and Haga 1990) passphrases (Porter 
1982) and graphical passwords (Xiaoyuan et al. 2005). Associative passwords are based on user-generated word association 
cue/response pairs, instead of the cue being only "password" (Smith 1987). Cognitive passwords are an extension of 
associative passwords in which the cue, instead of being a word, takes the form of a question based on personal facts or 
opinions (Zviran and Haga 1990). Passphrases are based on using an existing password system, but encourage significantly 
longer passwords, of up to 80 characters, by having users select passwords consisting of many words (a phrase) instead of a 
single word (Porter 1982). Graphical passwords use an image as the cue, and the response requires the user to click the 
appropriate places on the image, in the appropriate order (Xiaoyuan et al. 2005). What these alternative methods have in 
common is that they attempt to increase overall security while decreasing memory load on users. Of specific interest to us is 
the cognitive password system proposed and researched by Haga and Zviran (1989; 1991), Zviran and Haga (1990)  and 
subsequently covered by Bunnell et al. (1997). 
Cognitive Passwords 
Cognitive passwords are a form of associative password system, in which, instead of the traditional name and password 
prompt, users are prompted with a question whose answer is known to the user but presumed to be unknown to outside 
parties.  Cognitive questions fall into two categories as either being fact or opinion based.  An example of a fact based 
question would be "What is the name of the last grade school you attended?" and an example of opinion based question 
would be "Who is the greatest President of all times?” 
Haga and Zviran (1989) proposed that, in lieu of the single password required in traditional password systems, a cognitive 
password system would require a fixed number of questions (20) to be answered by the user at enrollment.   To gain access to 
the system, the authentication process would require the user to answer five randomly selected questions from the set of 
twenty answered at enrollment. If a user answers one of the questions incorrectly, then the user would be presented with 
another set of random questions. The second set would be generated by sampling with replacement. 
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The empirical studies by Haga and Zviran focus on demonstrating two points (Haga and Zviran 1991; Zviran and Haga 
1990a). First, they demonstrate that cognitive passwords are easier for users to remember than user- or system-generated 
single passwords with user recall of passwords being tested after a lapse of three months. Second, they demonstrate that 
while single cognitive passwords of a user may be guessed, certain cues when used appropriately could yield improved 
memorability/guessability ratios. They replicated their study with different subject pools to establish the validity of their 
results under the same set of conditions. Bunnel et al.'s (1997) replication over a shorter period of two weeks also supported 
the increased memorability of this type of system. 
These results provide a good starting point to argue the merits of a multiple password system based on cognitive passwords. 
However, they leave several questions unanswered.  First, all passwords are not used with the same frequency. Some 
accounts are accessed daily, while others may be accessed monthly and still others annually. In our experience, complex 
strong passwords are difficult to commit to memory initially, but once memorized are recalled with ease if used daily, but 
more difficult to recall if used infrequently. Second, Haga and Zviran (1989) suggest five random cognitive passwords out of 
a set of twenty. This raises the questions, are five passwords to access a system too many or too few, and, is a set of twenty 
enough to safeguard against accidental guessing?  Third, user acceptance of this variation of the traditional password system 
has not received much attention.  
User Acceptance Studies 
Faithful adoption of mandated systems, i.e., the use of systems as intended by the designers, requires an understanding user 
acceptance. Zviran and Elrich (2006) have recently emphasized the importance of user acceptance in selecting appropriate 
authentication systems.  
Earlier, Zviran and Haga (1993) investigated five different authentication systems, focusing on memorability. They asked 
their subjects to rank the systems, first according to ease of recall, and then according to how much they liked them. The 
ranking results were compared to the objective measures of recall taken in the experiment, and suggested there was no 
relationship between the two (e.g. users ranked self-generated passwords first for ease of recall, however the study's results 
showed that this type of password was actually third when measured objectively with recall rates of 27.2%). This study 
provides information on preference, which may be argued to be a surrogate for user acceptance.  
A key study of user acceptance of authentication systems is Keith et al.'s (2009) investigation of user acceptance of 
passphrases. Their research not only focuses on memory and typographical errors, but also on users' perceptions of ease of 
use, and usefulness from the perspective of the technology acceptance model. Their model shows that the login failure rate is 
influenced by perceived ease of use, which influenced perceived usefulness, which in turn led to an intention to adopt. No 
other study has examined user acceptance, and its role in adoption of an authentication system.   
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In general, we are interested in understanding user response to a multi-password system. There are two key issues that need 
to be clarified. First, we need to compare user responses to the multiple cognitive passwords system to the user responses to 
the traditional single strong password system. Second, we need to shed light on user responses to the multiple password 
system for the various combinations of parameters. Broadly, the research questions are: 
a) Are multiple password systems based on easily remembered cognitive passwords preferred to single password 
systems based on more difficult to remember strong password systems? 
b) To what extent does the number of cognitive passwords used in a multiple password system affect user perceptions 
of the ease of use and usefulness of the system? 
c) To what extent does the frequency of use of the system affect the perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness of 
the system? 
Single strong passwords may be user-generated or system-generated. User-generated passwords allow the users to choose 
whatever combination of characters they like, within system constraints, to be their authenticator where system generated 
passwords are based on randomly generated characters and are assigned to users without giving them a choice. Keith et al. 
(2007) did not find any support for the hypothesis that user generated passwords will lead to fewer memory errors than 
system generated passwords. On that basis, we will test only user generated strong passwords. We opt for user generated 
passwords rather than the system generated to stay consistent with the idea that cognitive passwords will be user generated. 
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THEORETICAL BASIS and HYPOTHESES 
Technology acceptance model (TAM) is the generally used basis for studying acceptance of technologies. In its simplest 
version, TAM states that perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness of a technology will influence the adoption of the 
technology (Davis 1989). In applying this model to the study of cognitive passwords, one needs to examine the relationship 
between the characteristics of the password systems to perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness of system, such as was 
done by Keith et al. (2007). We adapt the model tested by Keith et al. for our study (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 Proposed Theoretical Model 
Our theoretical model deviates from that of Keith et al. in some respects. First, once an organization adopts a password 
system, users are compelled to use it. However, users do have the choice to adopt a system faithfully or not, i.e., use the 
system in the spirit in which it was designed rather than use the system in ways which subvert the intent of the designer. So, 
we have modified their dependent variable intent to adopt to intent to faithfully adopt. 
Second, Keith et al. (2007) studied the differences between passphrases, user generated passwords and computer generated 
passwords. They indicate that these differ along the dimensions of password length, password complexity (randomness of 
characters) and source of password (user-generated or system-generated).  The proposal to use multiple passwords brings in 
an additional dimension, i.e., the number of passwords.  This will constitute one of the key variables in our theoretical model. 
Further, in our study, users will generate their own passwords, so source has been removed from the list of password 
characteristics. We will measure length of passwords to examine if it explains variances in dependent variables. 
Third, the Keith et al. model indicates that the effect of login credentials (password characteristics) on perceived ease of use 
will be mediated by the number of memory and typographical errors. We believe that, in addition to the mediated 
relationship, there is also a direct relationship between password characteristics and the perceived ease of use.  
Fourth, frequently used passwords are easier to remember than infrequently used passwords. We have included frequency of 
use as a variable that will influence login errors. 
Fifth, we argue that simple cognitive passwords are easier to remember than complex strong passwords because they have 
already been committed to long term memory in the users’ mind and are therefore not subject to short term memory 
limitations. Complex strong passwords, when used repeatedly can also get imprinted in the users’ minds when used 
repeatedly and frequently. Our model indicates that frequency of use moderates the relationship between password 
characteristics and login errors. In other words, for frequently used passwords, cognitive passwords and strong passwords are 
likely to lead to same number of errors, whereas, for infrequently used passwords, strong passwords will lead to greater 
number of errors than cognitive passwords. 
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Lastly, it should also be noted that security technologies are different from technologies that are primarily designed to 
improve productivity. With productivity technologies, such as a payroll application or an enterprise resource planning 
application, users may perceive the immediate efficiency or effectiveness with which a user can execute tasks related to 
his/her primary responsibilities. This ability to assess whether a technology improves efficiency or effectiveness helps 
influence perceived usefulness. With security technologies, the real usefulness is in the improved overall security. To most 
users, their responsibilities are of primary concern and security requirements are of secondary concern. Based on this 
argument, perceived usefulness may not be easily influenced by changes in the characteristics of the password systems 
(Liang and Xue 2009).  
Password Characteristics and Login Failures: Keith et al. (2007) demonstrated that use of passphrases led to fewer login 
errors than complex single passwords, both user-generated and computer-generated. In the current study, the individual 
cognitive passwords are not longer than the user-generated strong password, but there are more of them. The lower 
complexity of the cognitive passwords suggests that users of multiple cognitive passwords will make fewer login errors (both 
typographical and memory).  The larger number of cognitive passwords will not cause any increase in memory errors, 
because each password is easily remembered. It is unclear whether the larger number of cognitive passwords users are 
required to enter will cause more typographical errors.  
Cognitive passwords are easier to recall because they are embedded in the user’s memory and as such should be not be 
affected by short term memory failures. It is argued that complex passwords, if used frequently can also get embedded in the 
user’s memory and be recalled easily, i.e., if a password is being used frequently, there should be no difference between the 
login errors of cognitive passwords and strong passwords. On the bases of these arguments, it is hypothesized:   
H1a: For infrequently used (sets of) passwords, users of multiple cognitive passwords will make 
fewer total login errors than users of single strong passwords. 
H1b: For frequently used (sets of) passwords, there will be no difference in the number of errors 
made by users of multiple cognitive passwords when compared to the number of errors made 
by users of single strong passwords. 
Password Characteristics and Perceived Ease of Use: It is believed that complex passwords following random patterns that 
are harder to recall will be perceived as more difficult to use than cognitive passwords that follow familiar patterns that are 
used regularly. Based on this, it is hypothesized: 
H2a: The perceived ease of use of cognitive passwords will be higher than the perceived ease of 
use of strong passwords, for the same number of passwords.  
It is argued that users will find it annoying to enter multiple passwords. In fact, the larger the number of passwords that have 
to be entered to gain access to a system, the more likely it is that users will be annoyed.  Based on this, it is hypothesized: 
H2b: The perceived ease of entering multiple cognitive passwords will be negatively correlated to 
the number of passwords that have to be entered. 
Login Errors and Perceived Ease of Use: Login errors will slow the user down in their effort to start using a system. The 
greater the number of login errors the greater will be the user annoyance, and consequent perception that the system is not 
easy to use. So, it is hypothesized: 
H3a: The perceived ease of use will be negatively correlated to the number of login errors made 
by the user. 
Keith et al (2007) have reported a significant correlation between login errors and perceived usefulness (correlation 
coefficient = -0,14, p<0.05). Based on that, it is hypothesized: 
H3b: The perceived usefulness of the password system will be negatively correlated to the number 
of login errors made by the user. 
Password Characteristics, Login Errors and Perceived Usefulness: The usefulness of a password system lies in the 
increased security that it provides the information assets. Experiential use of a test system does not provide any connection to 
possible real improvement in security. Hence, it is argued that password characteristics will not be correlated to perceived 
usefulness. 
H4a: Password characteristics will not be correlated to perceived usefulness. 
Kreider et al. 
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Lima, Peru, August 12-15, 2010. 6 
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
We propose to conduct a longitudinal experiment to assess user response to multiple password systems. In this section, we 
describe the planned experiments. 
Experimental Design: There are three parameters that will be manipulated: (a) complexity of password, (b) number of 
passwords, and (c) the frequency of use.  
Complexity of passwords will be either simple or complex.  Simple passwords will consist of cognitive passwords, which 
will primarily be common facts that are a part of a user’s life.  Such facts are presumed to be deeply ingrained in the memory 
of the user, unlikely to be forgotten. Complex passwords, which are usually referred to as strong passwords in the traditional 
password systems are random combinations of upper and lower case characters, digits and non-alphanumeric characters.  
Greater effort is presumed to be needed to retain in memory and recall when needed.  
Number of passwords refers to the number of cognitive passwords that the user is expected to provide. Individual cognitive 
passwords are subject to discovery by guessing, spoofing or phishing. The requirement of multiple cognitive passwords for 
authentication reduces the likelihood of such discoveries. However, it is unclear how many passwords users would be willing 
to tolerate. While the research by Zviran and Haga (1990) used five, we will explore alternatives of one, three, five and 
seven.   
Users in real life have multiple computer accounts. Some accounts are used daily, others once a week, and still others at 
longer intervals. For experimental purposes, expecting subjects to log onto a simulated site daily would be excessive. At the 
other end, most student subjects are available for a three to four month period, so required usage intervals of longer than a 
month would provide the subjects insufficient experience to assess ease of use.  Based on these arguments, two levels of 
frequency of use will be used: weekly and monthly. Subjects will be emailed with instructions to access the website and 
retrieve information required for their classes. 
In summary, a fractional factorial design is planned. For the complex password, the number of passwords will be one. For the 
cognitive password case, the number of passwords will be one, three, five and seven. For each of these cases, there will be 
two levels of usage frequency: weekly and monthly. All passwords will be user-generated. Subjects will not be able to 
change passwords during the experiment because of the relatively short span of the study. 
 Weekly Monthly 










1 X X X X 
3  X  X 
5  X  X 
7  X  X 
X = subjects assigned to these cells. 
Table 1. Fractional Factorial Design 
Subjects: Students from the Introduction to Management Information Systems class will be solicited to volunteer as subjects.  
Students are appropriate, as they need to access multiple accounts on a variety of discrete systems.      
Experimental Set Up and Procedures: Subjects will complete an online demographics questionnaire when they enroll. In 
addition to the demographics, initial information will be gathered on their current password needs and experiences. Questions 
would include: how many computer accounts does the subject have, do these accounts have strong password requirements, 
does the subject use strong passwords, does the subject use same password for multiple accounts, does the subject write down 
passwords and so on. Then they will be assigned at random to one of the experimental conditions. Based on the experimental 
cell that a subject is assigned to, he/she will be required to set up a password or set up passwords.  
Subsequently, subjects will access the experimental web site when instructed by email to do so. Once they have logged in, a 
class related exercise or information will be provided. Specifically, the site will be designed to be a goal oriented site, that is 
a site they visit to perform a specific task, as opposed to generalized tasks such as social networking. When a subject logs in, 
the time, date of login will be recorded. The subject will be allowed to log in only when they have been requested to log in, to 
ensure that the frequency of usage is controlled.  
At the end of a three-month period, the subjects will complete a questionnaire, which will include items for perceived ease of 
use, perceived usefulness and willingness to adopt. Additionally, subjects from each cell will be invited to volunteer for an 
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additional exit interview. In the interview, we will try to elicit reasons why they believe such a system would be beneficial or 
detrimental. 
Measures: The variables in the study will be measured as follows: 
Complexity of Password:  For the experimental groups in which the subject are required to have a complex password, the 
password will be validated to ensure that it meets the requirements, i.e., the password includes upper and lower case letters, 
digits, and non alphanumeric characters, and is at least eight characters long. In the case of cognitive passwords, subjects may 
use simple passwords. The passwords will be scrutinized to see if complex passwords are being used.  
Number of passwords: Subjects with complex passwords (traditional strong password) will have only one password, Subjects 
with cognitive passwords will have one, three, five or seven passwords. 
Frequency of Password Use: Subjects will be required to access the target experimental website weekly or monthly, in 
response to an email request from the researchers. Subjects will not be allowed to access the site between email requests. 
Number of Memory and Typographical Errors:  Distinguishing between memory and typographical errors raises some issues. 
All password entries will be recorded. If more than one attempt was required to access the site, the subject will be asked to 
complete a short questionnaire to generate a self-report on why they failed to login correctly. The Levenshtein distance 
between the correct password and the passwords entered will be determined following procedures followed by Keith et al 
(2007; 2009) to validate the self-reported response. If after three attempts the subject is not able to get the password(s) 
correct, they will have an option to click on a button to indicate that they cannot remember the password. If they do so, they 
will be asked to complete the short questionnaire on why they failed to login correctly. 
Perceived Ease of Use, Perceived Usefulness, Intent to Faithfully Adopt: The scales used by Keith et al. (2007) will be used 
with minor modifications. 
CONCLUSION 
This article describes research-in-progress. The concept of using multiple easily-remembered cognitive passwords in lieu of a 
single difficult-to-remember strong password has been around for many years. Earlier researchers have shown that users 
recall cognitive passwords more readily than strong passwords, and that it is difficult for others to guess sub-sets of cognitive 
passwords. For the concept to progress further, much research remains to be done. One issue that has to be addressed is the 
user response to multiple password system. In the current article, we have proposed an experimental study to examine user 
acceptance of the system. We invite feedback on the concept of multiple password authentication systems, and the details of 
our experimental design. 
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